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Abstract 
 
Research on the effects of the institutional environment on firm market valuation have 
concentrated on formal institutions and in particular legal frameworks. However, changes in   
formal institutions may have little to no effect on the deeply ingrained socio-economic 
processes which determine the way of conducting business in a country. In such a situation, 
informal institutions may play a much more important role for firms. Using property rights as 
an example, this paper models the impact of formal and informal institutional changes on the 
market growth potential of Polish firms. Our examination indicates that Poland’s formal and 
informal institutions diverge significantly, with changes in informal institutions shaping 
market worth much more than binding formal frameworks. We conclude that firm valuation 
in an unstable institutional environment is due mostly to developments in informal property 
rights and other factors external to the firm, with comparatively little effect of firm-specific 
attributes.  
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I. Introduction  
Theories on how markets determine firm value have unsurprisingly been dominated by a 
focus on the firm’s behavior first and foremost, encapsulated in firm-specific attributes. A 
long literature has shown the predominance of such factors empirically, with company-level 
traits such as age (Pastor and Veronesi 2003), expected profitability (Varaiya et al. 1987), 
operating efficiency (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999), investment in tangible assets 
(Hirschey and Spencer 1992), leverage (Ghosh 2007), and size (Fama and French 1993, 1995) 
impacting firm returns to varying degrees.    
 
Another important, yet underresearched, stream of the financial literature has highlighted the 
significance of country institutional attributes (Bruno and Claessens 2010), pointing to how 
institutional systems inimical to transmission of information can lead to firm valuations 
fraught with uncertainty and substantially mis-priced (Enikolopov et al. 2014). And while 
firms may adapt to such environments with stronger internal governance in a bid to signal to 
markets strength (Durnev and Kim 2005), there may still be a penalty applied to firm 
valuations in low-quality institutional environments (La Porta et al. 2002). 
 
However, much of the work done on examining institutional frameworks and their influence 
on firm market value has focused mainly on formal, legal frameworks or governmental 
institutions as the sum total of a country institutional structure. This approach is defensible 
given the visibility, influence, and variety of forms of formal institutions (as well as ease of 
quantification via various governance metrics), as well as abundant theory on how formalised 
investor protection mechanisms affect company market value. Unfortunately, this approach 
begins to break down in environments where such frameworks are absent or weak, but where 
business continues to operate and even thrive.  Indeed, the fact that formal institution are 
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largely non-existent in a country does not necessarily mean that their fundamental roles (i.e., 
facilitating information flows, supervision and sanctioning, or contract enforcement, see 
Khanna and Palepu [1997]) are entirely absent. In fact, if such voids do emerge, they are 
promptly filled by informal institutions which bridge individuals and formal institutions. The 
fact that business does continue, even in an environment of pervasive formal institutional 
“voids” (Khanna et al. 2005), means as well that firms and agents must be relying on informal 
institutional realities (Gao et al. 2017) and their own ingenuity (Durnev and Kim 2005).    
 
A crucial adjunct to this reality is that, as both research and business practice has shown, the 
functioning of institutions at the informal level often diverges substantially from legislative 
texts (Doidge et al. 2007), especially in emerging or transition economies (Williams and 
Vorley 2015).1 This further complicates research into the firm, as we may be drawing 
incorrect conclusions regarding the effect of institutions on firms and how they are valued: are 
businesses basing their decisions on the law as written? Or are they planning and formulating 
strategy in response to the actual conditions they encounter on a daily basis (Tonoyan et al. 
2010; Sauerwald and Peng 2013)? Which strategy has more weight in determining a firm’s 
worth, formal institutional promises or informal realities? 
 
This paper seeks to explore these questions by examining informal institutional influence on 
firm market valuation in the specific context of a volatile post-transtion economy. We agree 
with Stephan et al. (2015:309) that “human behavior is shaped jointly by the constraints, 
incentives, and resources provided by formal and informal institutions, which can be more or 
less compatible with each other.” Our investigation focuses precisely on the situation where 
formal institutions are not more but actually less compatible with informal ones; our working 
                                                          
1 This was the source of Milka Casanegra de Jantscher’s (1990:179) famous quip that “tax administration is tax 
policy.” 
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hypothesis is that formal institutional changes in an emerging or post-transition economy may 
have little to no effect on company market growth potential, if the distance of the reform from 
the practices of informal institutions is too great.  
 
Our testing ground for this concept consists of two components: first, specific institutions 
within an institutional structure (both formal and informal) may have disparate impacts on the 
firm (Zheng et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2016). Given this reality, we focus on property rights as 
the most appropriate institution of interest, as the proper functioning of property rights 
decreases transaction and monitoring costs for business partners, facilitating company-level 
transparency and creating valuations which better reflect “true” value (La Porta et al. 2002, 
Knyazeva et al. 2013, Enikolopov et al. 2014). Additionally, property rights also have the 
benefit of being extensively studied and quantified, with the various relevant quantitative 
measures of property rights having different underlying assumptions (Williams and Siddique 
2008). The second component of our analysis exploits these differences econometrically in 
order to differentiate between “formal” and “informal” institutions: utilizing the commonly-
used ICRG index of contract viability to proxy for formal institutions and the Clague et al. 
(1996, 1999) measure of contract-intensive money to proxy for informal institutions, we can 
reveal the effects of informal institutions in an empirical analysis of firms in a specific 
economy.  
 
Poland, a volatile-yet-advanced emerging economy, was chosen as the test case for this 
analysis, as it has been subject to large formal institutional upheaval over a short period of 
time but with correspondingly slower change in its informal institutional structures. 
Moreover, analyses of firm market value remain scarce in the context of advanced emerging 
markets such as Poland (Malinowska 2018), Our analysis uses this institutional divergence to 
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ascertain the nature of its impact on firm valuation, a firm attribute which shaped heavily by 
(and sensitive to) the institutional environment (Durnev and Kim 2005). 
 
Our results, while not necessarily quantifying the size of the gap between formal and informal 
property rights in Poland, do show that the gap does exist at a substantive level and has 
persisted throughout the transition and in particular in the post-EU accession period. More 
importantly, this study reveals that the informal institutional sphere matters more than formal 
institutions in their effect on market growth of Polish firms. Using dynamic panel data 
methods to econometrically analyse formal and informal property rights, we show that, while 
formal legislative indicators appear to have a negative impact on the market positions of 
Polish firms, changes in our preferred measure of informal property rights correlated 
positively with increasing firm market potential and dwarfed the effects of the formal business 
environment. We conclude that formal institutional changes are likely to have an effect on 
firms only if these reforms are aligned with informal institutional realities. 
    
II. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Informality and firms 
Stephan et al (2015:310) conceptualize informal institutions as “slowly changing, culturally 
transmitted and socially constructed institutions.” As with formal institutions, informal ones 
are often perceived as existing in order to facilitate socio-economic processes, i.e., reduce 
transaction costs, resolve information asymmetries, and encourage certain behaviors either by 
group members or outsiders (Hartwell 2013). In weak institutional environments, informal 
institutions may substitute for formal institutional mechanisms such as financial markets or 
the judiciary, crafting a local solution to a national void. Yet, informal institutions may also 
prove a hindrance as well, creating pressures for compliance (Maksimov et al. 2017) which 
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may be difficult for outsiders to achieve either legally or culturally; indeed, this function may 
be more commonly found in informal institutions than in formal ones, as lack of knowledge 
about the local ways of conducting business (iterative processes themselves which may have 
evolved to advantage certain groups) likely creates market entry barriers for foreign firms.  
 
The role of informal institutions in the make-up of the business environment, coupled with 
their force of moral suasion and/or other forms of sanctioning, means that they necessarily 
influence not only how business is conducted but also how it is perceived. Informal 
institutions may precipitate changes in its behavior to comport with cultural and professional 
norms beyond the formal institutional realm (Minbaeva and Muratbekova-Touron 2013), yet 
their impact needs not stop at firm strategy. In reality, informal normative institutions may 
potentially shape all dimensions of corporate up to and including assessment by market 
players (see Figure 1).  This impact of informal institutions on firm operation and valuation is 
heightened if formal institutional structures are weak or, less obviously, in a situation where 
formal and informal institutions are in conflict. The latter situation may arise from formal 
policy or institutional changes aiming explicitly to either alter cultural tenets or break the 
barriers to business erected by informal institutions. Indeed, many formal reforms may be 
implemented with apparent lack of societal logic – in other words they are incompatible at 
time t with the societies in which they are ostensibly based. Then, with such rules not 
internalized by society, compliance can be achieved under political or legal pressure. 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
The gulf between formal and informal institutions can persist for years, if not decades. Even if 
temporary, such disjoint puts an economy in an unstable and non-equilibrium position – at 
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some point, either culture or power will assert itself to become the dominant (if not sole) 
institutional matrix, and informal rules may become institutionalized and condition the types 
of exchanges allowed (Chacar et al. 2010). Informal sanctions and practices may need a 
generation to pass from the scene, while formal political institutions may require successive 
rounds of voting and political will to converge with informal practice - again meaning a long 
period of disequilibrium. We thus hypothesise that this violent divergence of the formal and 
informal creates the real “institutional void,” challenging businesses to navigate between a 
country’s two poles of formal and informal rules (and its many sub-poles of informality).   
 
Transition economies, where ‘‘fundamental and comprehensive changes [are] introduced to 
the formal and informal rules of the game’’ (Peng, 2003: 275), appear a special case in point, 
as they represent an entire institutional system in a state of flux. Characterized by rapid and 
substantial institutional changes at the formal level, often introduced as part of a large 
package and done concurrently with macroeconomic stabilization reforms, such formal 
developments are necessarily implemented without similar comprehensive changes in 
informal institutions (Maksimov et al. 2017). The latter, by definition, cannot be imposed 
from above, meaning that the divergence between formal and informal institutions may be 
particularly pronounced in a transition economy (Williams and Vorley 2015). While formal 
institutional changes usually aim to bring new or reformed formal institutions closer to the 
informal reality (especially with regard to commerce), that is, unfortunately, not always the 
case and the exogenously-inspired reforms end creating large institutional voids between 
formality and informality (see Hartwell [2014] for the specific example of capital markets). In 
such an environment fraught with institutional uncertainty, firm market entry and business 
strategy are even more difficult to set; at the same time, firm performance measurement 
methods and credibility of market-based company valuations are called into question.  
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One of the key institutions at the heart of the transition process is economic and legal property 
rights, the basis for a market economy and an institution formally eradicated under decades of 
communism.  Countless research has established the importance of good property rights for 
firm performance, as they are one of the institutions to affect the firm throughout the entire 
continuum shown in Figure 1: in the first instance, property rights have been shown to be 
crucial for firm performance, structuring the incentives of firms towards productive activities 
(Baumol 1990); moreover, quality property rights will reduce costs of production for firms, as 
well as enable contractual relations with suppliers and other agents (Yasar et al. 2011).  
 
More suited to our purposes, property rights should directly correlate with firm valuation, as 
“firms operating in an environment with insecure property rights are uncertain about their 
ability to keep the fruits of their efforts and as a consequence, decrease their investment 
activities” (Berkowitz et al. 2015:583). Additionally, Hail and Leuz (2006) show that poor 
property rights translate into higher costs of equity, while Djankov et al. (2007) note that legal 
reforms assuring investor protection result in higher levels of credit to the private sector. 
Finally, efficient property rights laws incentivises greater information-sharing without the fear 
of being penalised (Enikolopov et al. 2014; Rodrik et al. 2004) and mitigates firm-level 
transparency management, presumably leading to more accurate firm valuation. Improved 
informational transparency then facilitates access to external financing or more profitable, 
long-term deployment of existing assets, such as research and development and building 
human capital (Fan et al. [2012] show that property rights influence firm capital structures 
and reliance on debt). 
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Research Hypotheses 
Given the likely divergence of formal and informal institutions in transition, and given the 
importance of both formal and informal property rights for business performance, this paper 
advances two hypotheses: 
 
H1: Formal and informal property rights institutions did diverge in transition economies and 
this divergence has persisted  
 
This first hypothesis challenges us to prove that there actually was a divergence between 
formal and informal property rights in transition economies; with no divergence, the 
importance of informal institutions will likely be minimal and subsumed to formal 
institutions.  
 
The obstacle in proving this hypothesis comes from the inherent difficulty in quantitatively 
measuring informal institutions. Subjective indicators have been the most commonly utilized 
in the literature to proxy for institutions, and with apparently good reason: as Grogan and 
Moers (2001:326) notes, subjective measures “are likely to reflect concerns about the quality 
of institutions more closely and directly.” Unfortunately, subjective indicators have certain 
shortcomings: indeed, “subjective evaluations are tainted by the theories, ideologies, 
prejudices, and so forth of the respondent” (Voigt 2013:18-19).  
 
This taint may extend to confusion on what is actually being measured: as Glaeser et al. 
(2004) argue, many institutional indicators mix, to a varying degree, both institutional factors 
and policy. More relevant for our purposes, subjective indicators are commonly based on 
perception of a country’s formal institutions rather than the actual functioning of various 
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institutions on the ground. This point has been made in reference to property rights indicators 
and their relationship with growth: Williamson and Kerekes (2011), in particular, argue that 
subjective indicators (in this case, the ICRG index) of property rights are outcome variables, 
ones that do “not reflect permanent political constraints because [they] rise with per capita 
income.”2  
 
The same criticism can be made about subjective indicators when thinking of the relationship 
between formal laws and informal norms. The formal institutional changes accompanying 
transition can create the mirage of institutional change, without touching the cognitive and 
normative functions of informal institutions. In extreme cases, the perception of institutional 
change, embodied in legislative change, may be entirely illusory, as informal institutions and 
social currents may impede the actual institutional transformation. Under such a scenario, 
indices would reflect the letter of the law, a proposed change to formal institutions, rather than 
an actual institutional shift.3 Our quantification of a country’s institutional quality would thus 
be based on the idealized conception of formal institutions as embodied in law rather than the 
actual formal and informal institutional functioning of a particular country.4  
 
Objective indicators, on the other hand, rely on readily observable, ex-post indicators that 
could theoretically proxy for the functioning of informal institutions within an economy. 
Objective metrics, since they are explicit in capturing economic outcomes of an efficient 
institutional system and not just formal legislation, could be more preferable to subjective 
metrics in social sciences.  Yet, such metrics are often crude and encompass much more than 
                                                          
2 While their argument appears to come down in favour of subjective indicators (due to the ICRG index 
ostensibly encompassing formal and informal institutions), it notably avoids the issue of informal institutions, 
which is crucial to our argument. 
3 Moreover, a change in a subjective institutional index on the occasion of a legislative change would necessarily 
predate the actual institutional change, as formal institutions can also be slow-moving. 
4 From a technical point of view as well, the ICRG indices, as opposed to metrics published by Polity IV or the 
Heritage Foundation, display significant variation over time in the short term.  
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the main desired effect. With very few true variables to be observed ex-post to show that 
property rights are being enforced or that a judiciary is independent we are left observe 
institutions in the breach rather than in practice, seeing that effective property rights do not 
generate events per se (i.e. we are looking for the dog that doesn’t bark). But, given that 
objective indicators capture outcomes by design, they may approximate informal institutional 
influence better than the potential formal institution desired by a piece of legislation.  
 
With regard to property rights, this difference between subjective and objective can also map 
neatly to the differences between formal and informal property rights. In particular, we assert 
that a subjective indicator of property rights, the ICRG index on contract viability (henceforth 
ICRG CV), can trace the development of the formal sphere of property rights institutions. The 
ICRG CV is an index which defines property rights and the extent of their security as a 
function of their danger of being expropriated by the ruling government (coded on a scale 
from 1 to 4, with higher numbers corresponding to higher property rights). It is this focus on 
the interaction of the private and the public sector which makes the CV measure an excellent 
guide to understanding the formal institutional framework of property rights, as it explicitly 
excludes informal arrangements and only focuses on the threat of expropriation by formal 
political authorities  
 
To quantify informal property rights, we also assert than an objective indicator can be the best 
approximation of informal institutions; for this, we turn to contract-intensive money (CIM), 
measured as the percentage of money held inside the formal financial (i.e. banking) sector as a 
proportion of all money. Its underlying concept is that strong property rights, i.e. those which 
are protected at any point by a strong network of institutions, will draw money into the formal 
financial sector. CIM thus assumes that stronger social values corresponding to both legal and 
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economic property rights of individuals, not necessarily enforced on pain of criminal 
prosecution or otherwise, reflect greater formal financial sector participation at the level of 
society (Clague et al. 1999).5  Indeed, in its objectivity, CIM aims to track a society’s 
collective actions in response to socio-institutional (r)evolution rather than relying on 
individual subjective evaluation of legislation. While, as a quantitative measure, it likely 
captures more than solely informal institutional workings, it is a much better proxy for 
informality than external expert-based indices tracking contemporaneous legislative changes.6 
 
H2: Informal normative property rights institutions are more important for firm valuation in 
transition 
 
Theories on how markets determine firm value has, not surprisingly, been dominated by a 
focus on the firm’s behavior first and foremost, encapsulated in firm-specific factors such as 
age (Pastor and Veronesi 2003), expected profitability (Varaiya et al. 1987), operating 
efficiency (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999), leverage (Ghosh 2007), and size (Fama 
and French 1993, 1995). However, it is not enough for a firm to be performing well in order 
to have an accurate (and high) valuation; it is also of crucial importance that such information 
be communicated to markets to create an accurate picture of current and future firm prospects, 
and the fact that obtaining such information may have a high or prohibitive cost in some 
environments may mean that firm valuation is reliant on more than just firm behavior. 
 
                                                          
5 Guiso et al. (2004, 2008) also report that trust, a key informal institution, accounts for wider equity market 
participation, a mechanism which is also assumed in CIM. 
6 The application of a purely financial indicator to capture institutional development of a country may be 
perceived as misguided, and Williams and Siddique (2008) remarked that CIM could better proxy for the state of 
a country’s financial system as opposed to property rights. However, as noted in Hartwell (2014, 2016), the 
financial system of any country is slow-changing and the application of high-frequency data to calculate CIM 
allows to capture shifts in realized property rights rather than financial sector development. Moreover. use of 
CIM is not recent by any means (Clague et al. 1996) and has been used extensively in the literature.  
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The key mechanism via which financial information is transmitted is of course the price 
system, but the price system itself is shaped, embedded, and operated within a country’s 
institutional structures. If an institutional system inimical to transmission of information, or 
one which increases transaction costs for obtaining information, it can be expected that firm 
valuations will be fraught with uncertainty and can be substantially mis-priced. Moreover, the 
actual information being communicated can be different depending upon who is doing the 
judgment, i.e. if firm-specific performance is being judged by formal institutions or by 
informal ones (as noted above, La Porta et al. [2002] find firm valuations in low-quality 
institutional environments suffer a penalty). 
 
In line with Hypothesis 1, we hypothesize (as others have noted) that formal institutions are 
important for firm valuation; however, where informal institutions are misaligned with formal 
institutions, it is informal institutions which will predominate in assessing a firm’s 
performance. Taking the example of property rights, formal legislation on contract 
enforcement may indeed correlate with higher firm valuation as such rights have a salutary 
effect on financial sector development, as noted above. But Besley and Ghatak (2010) make a 
case that not only are there many situations where contract enforcement is best handled in a 
local, informal setting, but also access to finance may be easier informally (especially if a 
financial sector is weak, fragmented, or requires political connections to enter).  
 
That this is indeed the case in transition economies, as lack of opportunities further afield 
means that a firm’s suppliers or customers were likely to be local, leading to less incentive to 
renege on contracts (McMillan and Woodruff 2002). Similarly, local or industry-specific 
enforcement mechanisms meant that companies which failed to comport in line with informal 
expectations were punished in terms of their performance (McMillan and Woodruff [2002] 
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use the example of gossip amongst Vietnamese firms). From the negative side, informal 
institutions such as organized crime, squatters, and social groups may predominate at the local 
level over legislative changes, making the legal claims of firms less secure and subject to 
more negotiation and transactions than legislation would assume (Lanjouw and Levy 2002).  
 
Given the influence of informal institutions in situations where state capacity or enforcement 
is low (i.e. most transition and emerging market economies), a firm’s value would thus not 
depend on formal property rights protection as embodied in law, but on the way in which the 
firm interacted with (and was able to satisfy) informal property rights institutions. Put another 
way, even though formal property rights changes may move in a direction which would be 
beneficial to a firm, firm performance and valuation may not shift if informal institutions do 
not also follow. We surmise that such formal changes would have little effect or possibly even 
a negative one on firm valuation, if they forced a firm to become misaligned with realities on 
the ground in the name of harmonizing with formal institutions (which themselves are 
misaligned). In a country where there is a substantial institutional distance between formality 
and informality, firms will only improve their performance by catering to informal 
institutions. 
 
III. Hypothesis 1: The Case of Poland 
Poland, a high-performing post-transition economy, is an excellent case for observing the 
divergence between formal and informal property rights and what effect this had on firm 
market-based pricing mechanisms. In fact, Poland stands out among other CEE economies as 
a country in which property rights never ceased to be, even at the height of socialism. 
Hartwell (2016: 147-148) notes that “the socialist envelopment of the economy was not as 
extensive as elsewhere in the region” and “only 63 percent of national product came from the 
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socialized sector, lowest among all Soviet bloc countries.” After joining the EU in 2004, it 
was anticipated that the legal framework for property rights would remain at a fairly high and 
consistent level. However, even at this late stage of transition, a gulf between what was being 
proposed at the government level and what was actually occurring on the ground remained 
discernible; subsequent changes in formal judicial frameworks (2007-2015) served only to 
widen the rift.  
 
To illustrate this divergence in Poland (and thus validate our first hypothesis), we use the two 
metrics of institutional development noted in the previous section. Poland’s formal property 
rights framework over 2007 to 2015, measured by the ICRG CV measure, remained 
inconsistent, with substantial fluctuations corresponding to legislative and regulatory changes 
during this timeframe (Figure 2). The largest reform was the introduction of an Act on Court 
Bailiffs and Debt Collections liberalising the bailiff profession.7 This breaking up of the 
quasi-monopoly of the bailiffs (Józefowicz 2007), precipitated an increase in (formal) 
institutions in the first quarter of 2008. Further legislative developments in September 2011 
amounting to an amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure and later in the first quarter of 
2012 a 20% reduction in the number of first-instance courts reversed these gains.8  
 
Institutional change likely eludes synthetic indices, as these measures track policies and not 
institutions creating them - thus it is perhaps more instructive to think of them as Type II 
policies designed to affect institutions but not fuel institutional change per se (Williams and 
Siddique 2008). This illustrates our point, as reforms in the formal legislative environment do 
not necessarily correspond to changes in a country’s overall ingrained institutional setting. 
                                                          
7 At the time of this writing, the Act on Court Bailiffs and Debt Collections have been subject to a staggering 
number of amendments (30 in the past decade), with the last one entering into force on 28th October 2017.  
8 According to 2014 data, Poland reports precisely 0.8 first-instance courts per 100,000 inhabitants, less than half 
the EU average of 2, See European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (2016).  
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They may have little effect on informal institutions, even as they are working to change 
formal institutions9.    
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
Although the two indicators use different scales, the divergence in trends between the 
measures is clearly discernible in Figure 2: while formal property rights institutions waned 
from 2011 onward, informal institutions remained fairly impervious to political maneuvering 
on property rights (with only some seasonal variation) and actually increased until early 
2015.10 It is only in Q1 2015 that we detect a noticeable and persistent downturn in the 
informal practice of property rights in the country, but even by the end of 2015 property rights 
were still approximately two percentage points higher than they were in the depths of the 
global financial crisis. Contrasted with formal institutional changes from 2011 to 2014, 
informal institutions appeared to fill the void, creating an atmosphere of business as usual. 
 
It was not until the election of the current government in 2015 that informal property rights 
appeared to actually be under threat. This raises an interesting theoretical point regarding 
internal institutional distance: it seems that some of that distance can always be closed by a 
government willing to deploy massive resources or political will to impose formal institutions 
                                                          
9 We recognize that the argument that formal institutions are also slow-moving, and that there is an institutional 
distance between legislative changes and institutional change, is manifestly the point of earlier critiques of 
subjective indicators (as in Glaeser et al. 2004). While we believe this is an important point, as even formal 
institutions do not change merely because a law does (implementation and administration are crucial), the fact 
remains that formal institutional change has legislative change as a necessary, if not sufficient, precursor. Thus, 
there may be distance between formal institutional functioning and legislative change, but our point remains that 
there is even greater distance between legislative change and informal institutional change. In fact, the larger the 
gap between legislative change/formal institutional change, the larger the gap will be between legislative 
changes and informal institutional shifts. 
10 Given the problems inherent in observing shifts in informal property rights at the local, regional, and even 
country-wide level over a short time period, it is difficult to say why our measure of informal institutions may 
have improved over this timeframe. We conjecture that there were several issues, including a general change in 
mood following the political events from end 2009, including the sweeping of the Law and Justice party from the 
Presidency in early 2010 – as we show below, Law and Justice hold a decidedly non-free-market position and 
thus informal institutions may have been under threat (see also Figure 3). In addition, improvements in general 
economic conditions could also have induced more utilization of informal property rights (just because they exist 
does not mean they will be used, especially if economic conditions are depressed). Put another way, given more 
opportunities for commerce, but a general perception that formal institutions were in decline, people turned to 
informal institutions to take advantage of these opportunities.  
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over informal ones. Indeed, prior political changes to formal institutions in Poland had little 
effect at the informal level simply because these changes tinkered with administrative 
procedures. The elections in 2015 seem to have been qualitatively different, creating a real 
threat to both formal and informal institutions.  
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
Plotted against CIM, the ICRG’s subjective “political risk” indicator (Figure 3), capturing the 
perception of the threat which formal changes in Poland’s government might pose to 
preservation of established informal socio-economic norms, comprises of several expert-
based indices11 covering administrative capacities as well as institutional factors. The two 
indices move in almost exactly the opposite directions over 2007 to 2015: the low level of 
informal property rights early in the period coincided with elevated political risk, while the 
final quarter of 2009 brought about certain improvement as the danger of political interference 
in the business sphere subsided.12 In hindsight, it seemed like the quiet before the real storm 
in form of the 2015 pre-election turmoil and the subsequent victory of the populist 
government. With the threat of massive formal changes on the horizon, informal institutions 
were once again under pressure. 
 
 
 
 
IV. Hypothesis 2: Effects Of Informal Institutions On Firm Valuation 
                                                          
11 Including corruption within a country’s political system, socioeconomic pressures, and a government’s power 
to carry out its declared goals as well as its potential to stay in office 
12 In particular, the Polish Presidency of the EU and the 2011 Parliament elections won by the center-right Civic 
Platform (PO) appeared to have instilled confidence in the protection of property rights. 
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The Model 
This brief overview of the development of Poland’s property rights shows that formal and 
informal property rights did indeed diverge substantially. Turning to our second hypothesis, 
how did this divergence affect firms, and in particular, their valuation? In order to formally 
model the relationship between the effects of the gap between law and implementation on 
firm valuation, we have compiled a new unbalanced quarterly panel of data encompassing 
company-level, institutional, stock, and macroeconomic variables for 218 non-financial 
entities listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) from 2007 to 2015 (Tables A1, A2, and 
A3 in the Appendix show the detailed description, source information, summary statistics, and 
correlations for each variable).13  
 
Our baseline equation for this analysis is: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛽𝑀𝑖,(𝑡−1) + 𝛾𝑀𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛼(𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 denotes the observed change in relative firm market value (expressed as a log 
change in the firm price-earnings ratio (P/E) measured year-over-year) while 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖  
controls for time, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 represents unobserved firm- and sectoral-level fixed effects.14 We 
base our choice of the dependent variable on its ease of interpretation, as well as documented 
use both in financial analyses and academic research (e.g.  Fama and French 1993, 1995, 
2015; Foye and Mramor 2013, 2016). The extant literature also highlights P/E’s utlisation 
among other commonly-used multiples such as price-to-earnings or price-to-sales ratios (as 
well as metrics based on cash flow, such as enterprise value relative to earnings before 
                                                          
13 The data was winsorized at the 1% level to remove the most extreme outliers. 
14 We are well aware that this approach would be insufficient had we decided to capture the interactions between 
institutional and industry factors. Such effects could provide valuable insights, especially with regard to more 
formalised and state-dependent sectors. However, given the size and nature of our sample it is probable that 
certain industries could be underrepresented, therefore introduction of industry effects could potentially yield 
biased results. 
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interest and taxes) in firm market valuation (see especially Lie and Lie 2002, Fama and 
French 2002, and Cheung et al. 2009). Relevant contemporary research has relied on what has 
been commonly, yet mistakenly, taken for Tobin’s q to approximate firm market value in the 
context of changing firm internal and external factors. Looking back at the original Tobin’s q 
and its intended role as a macroeconomic investment policy modelling tool, we argue that the 
current version utilised in corporate finance is not only dubiously grounded in theory but also 
does not capture what the majority of academic researchers believe it to do. With Tobin’s q 
being clearly unsuitable for the pursposes of this study, we decided to take the road less 
travelled and rely on the P/E ratio as, even if imperfect in many ways, by all apearances less 
unreliable than the q metric (for a broader account of these issues, see Appendix B). 
 
In the Polish case, the P/E for each of the 218 firms in our sample needed to be assembled 
individually, hand-collected and calculated from data provided by Stooq (a publicly-available 
domestic source of company market data and one commonly used in scholarly literature). Our 
main vector of interest, 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑡−1, captures the divergence between formal and 
informal property rights institutions; it includes the key property rights variables as noted 
above, the ICRG contract viability measure (for formal property rights) and contract-intensive 
money (for informal rights).  
 
Firm-level determinants of company value are represented by 𝛽𝛼𝛽𝑀𝑖,(𝑡−1) . It includes firm 
size, leverage, operating efficiency, and growth opportunities (all shown to be important in 
the extant literature as in e.g. Charitou and Constantidinis [2004] and Damodaran [2006]). All 
the firm-specific variables have been retrieved from company periodical financial reports, 
processed by Notoria Serwis SA, a domestic market data provider. 𝑀𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛼𝑡−1accounts for 
the role of the broader economy in firm valuation, focusing specifically on ease of obtaining 
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external financing by firms: to capture this we utilize two facets of the domestic equity market 
(its quarterly rate of return and volatility) and the state of the Polish banking system (captured 
by the shifts in the amount of credit available to nonfinancial entities relative to GDP). We 
also control for inflation, as previous empirical studies on the effect of inflation suggest not 
only a negative, but also possibly a non-linear impact on firm market pricing, translating into 
weaker market acitivity (see Boyd et al. 2001) and changes in overall domestic financial 
depth (M2).15 Finally, we also introduce an additional objective indicator from ICRG, the 
“Economic Risk Rating” (ICRG ERR), to capture economic/market risk via a combination of 
numerous outcome variables, including the current account as a percentage of GDP and GDP 
per capita.16 The ICRG ERR has the benefit of mirroring (to a certain extent) fluctuations in 
Polish market risk as captured in the market beta calculated by Damodaran (see Figure A1 in 
the appendix); we believe that sectoral/contextual factors are already captured in the volatility 
of the WIG market index.17  
 
In choosing an estimator, the relevant literature highlights the problem of pervasive and 
persistent endogeneity in relation to both institutional and firm-level controls. With this in 
mind, we fashion a dynamic panel model using a two-step system general method of moments 
estimator (2-step SYS-GMM) with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation-robust errors 
using the finite-sample corrected method (Windmeijer 2005). The approach instruments 
variables using their own lags, and our strategy for this model is to limit the number of 
instruments to avoid over-proliferation (Roodman 2009); we also report results ensuring that 
                                                          
15 While changes in M2 and inflation may be regarded really as two sides of the same coin, they approximate a 
country’s macroeconomic management in two different ways: growth of M2 relative to GDP and quarterly 
fluctuations in the level of inflation proxy for actions and non-actions of the government and central bank 
respectively. Collinearity does not appear worrying: as corroborated by the correlation of+45%; we also report a 
correlation of 43% between CIM and GDP changes and of -21% between CIM and the ICRG ERR (see Table 
A3 for details on the magnitude of correlation between all of the variables). 
16 Following on the last note, there is a low level of correlation between the ICRG ERR measure and our 
measure of GDP per capita growth (0.13), also alleviating concerns about collinearity. 
17 We use Damodaran’s (2006) publicly available ex-post annual calculations for Poland, see the data at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datacurrent.html 
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second-order correlation in the first-differenced residuals and correlation between the chosen 
instruments and the residuals is absent (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). 
As a further check against endogeneity, and as shown in Equation 1, we also lag all our 
explanators by one period, a decision which mitigates against cross-sectional dependence as 
consistent estimates are obtainable when using the SYS-GMM estimator provided the spatial 
term is lagged accordingly (Bouayad-Agha and Védrine 2010).18   
 
Results 
Table 1 presents the baseline results: in an interesting twist, in none of the four initial models 
are the firm parameters we utilize statistically significant for firm valuation in Poland. While 
unusual (since the firm-specific variables used here are standard in the literature), these results 
are stable across numerous specifications, and it appears that, in Poland over this timeframe at 
least, firm market pricing may have been determined in greater part by external, as opposed to 
firm-specific, factors. Given Poland’s status as an emerging market, it is perfectly conceivable 
that external factors also may neutralize the impact of firm-specific ones, including equity 
market profitability (positively correlated with firm value), inflation (negative), the ICRG 
economic risk rating (positive), and GDP changes (negative).  Between our specifications, we 
observe some differences in the magnitude of impact of the control variables; however, those 
are relatively small and dilute neither the strength nor direction of influence of the control set. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
More importantly for this examination, shifts in CIM result in significant and upward 
movements in firm market valuation (Columns 1 and 2). Conversely, changes in formal 
                                                          
18 Stationarity of the variables was ensured via a series of unit root tests based on the canonical augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (Table A4 in the Appendix). 
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institutional structures correlate negatively with firm market value, as legislative 
developments affect firm value in a significant manner, both economically and statistically 
(Columns 3 and 4). The divergence between formal and informal institutions is most glaring 
in the scale of the impact of each measure: for example, every 1% change in informal 
property rights, corporate market value increases by 4.6% while it decreases by 1.3% when 
considered vis-à-vis formal legal structures.19  
 
The results of the baseline equation support our second hypothesis regarding the effect of 
informal institutions on firm valuation. Indeed, at least in the Polish case, it seems that well-
meant legal reforms to formal property rights institutions instead brought unwanted and 
unpredicted consequences which obstructed investor rights. Coupled with the evidence shown 
above, it appears that property rights institutions are better understood within Poland at the 
informal level rather than in their formal iteration.   
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
To further test this hypothesis and understand the sensitivity of the baseline results, we extend 
the analysis to include both measures of formal and informal institutional development in the 
same regression (Table 2). The obtained evidence underpins our hypotheses, as formal 
institutions appear to subtract between 1.7% and 1.9% from firm market potential with every 
unit of change. Simultaneously, informal institutions affect firm market value in the opposite 
direction, adding, all else equal, between 2.1% and 2.6%. Similar to the first set of 
regressions, firm-specific controls remained of marginal significance, with the D/E ratio the 
only statistically significant factor. Interestingly, the importance of the domestic equity 
                                                          
19 In terms of the adequacy of the model, the conditions necessary for the use of the SYS-GMM estimator are 
satisfied, with no disturbing second-order correlation and satisfactory Sargan test outcomes on the validity of the 
instrument set. 
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market diminished in terms of statistical significance. At the same time market risk (the IRCG 
ERR indicator) retained its importance, suggesting a positive correlation between firm market 
growth potential and economic risk – an observation which aligns, in terms of direction and 
impact, with the influence of market volatility on firm market valuation. 
 
As a robustness test (Tables 3 and 4), we incorporate other aspects of the domestic and 
international business environment which could plausibly correlate with firm value. Our non-
results regarding firm-level controls, in particular, may be a quirk of transition, where internal 
institutional and corporate changes may be less important for firm market valuation than the 
broader economic environment. To control for the possible role of external factors in firm 
valuation, exogenous from domestic institutions, we re-run the regressions with the inclusion 
of shifts in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to proxy for firm access to finance. FDI 
has been shown to ameliorate asset allocation and raise market efficiency, thus boosting firm 
market potential (Yasar and Paul 2007); however, there is also the possibility that FDI can 
precipitate substantial competition effects, favoring foreign businesses and lowering domestic 
firm valuation (Konings 2001). In addition to FDI, given the relatively small size of the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange and the greater reliance of an emerging market such as Poland on 
global economic conditions, we also include American and European equity market indices to 
proxy for the overall global economic situation.20  
 
[TABLES 3 and 4 HERE] 
 
                                                          
20 With an almost non-existent foreign debt and an annual average ratio of revenues from export to total revenues 
hitting 0.63% in 2008 and oscillating between 0.59% and 0.79% between 2009 and 2013 (with a high at 0.8% in 
2014), the correlation of Polish firms’ market value and international equity market conditions is not as obvious 
as what could have been expected in relation to the domestic stock market (Authors’ own calculations based on 
the data retrieved from the Notoria Serwis SA database) 
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It seems that the inclusion of FDI in both models does not affect the results of either formal or 
informal property rights, while FDI itself has an insignificant effect (which might only be 
supportive of Koning’s [2001] insights). With regard to global economic conditions, both 
international stock markets have a much larger effect on the current market worth of Polish 
companies than the domestic market: for the model including informal property rights, every 
1% of the S&P 500’s rate of return adds approximately 4.9% to Polish firm market growth. 
More importantly, both institutional metrics manifest little change in their effects, meaning 
that, even accounting for external conditions, it appears that a country’s own institutional 
distance between its informal and formal institutions may negatively impact firm market 
value. In this case, it seems plausible to conclude that property rights changes at the formal 
level misaligned with informal institutions, and it was only informal changes which affected 
firm valuation.21 
 
V. Conclusions 
The impact of informal institutions on firm behavior is a complicated question, one which is 
only starting to gain traction in the literature as we expand our understanding of institutions in 
general. This paper has delivered pioneering insights on the diverging influence of formal and 
informal property rights on firm market value in Poland utilizing a new quarterly dataset of 
institutional, macroeconomic, and company-level data between 2007 and 2015. In particular, 
our analysis has shown that there was in fact a divergence between formal and informal 
                                                          
21 As an additional robustness test, we replaced the dependent variable, the firm P/E ratio (which should convey 
a firm’s market potential), with a purely accounting metric, i.e. firm earnings per share (EPS). EPS, calculated as 
a ratio of firm earnings before tax and its number of shares does not necessarily convey information about 
market positioning in as effective a manner as the P/E ratio but nonetheless often has a positive association with 
stock prices (Bao and Bao 2004). Given its very nature, we would expect that firm EPS might, in fact, be more 
sensitive to firm-specific conditions than to external factors. However, the obtained (non) results proved 
unsatisfactory – without changing the initial model specification markedly, we did not detect a statistically 
significant impact of either internal or external factors, even though the technical parameters (including 
instrument selection and autocorrelation-related issues) appeared to meet the theoretical prerequisites. Due to 
these reasons and for the sake of brevity, these results are not included here but results are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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property rights institutions during this period as demonstrated in two commonly-used metrics 
for property rights; on the basis of this reality, we also were able to demonstrate that informal 
rights likely had a more profound influence on firm market valuation than the simple act of 
changing legislation.  
 
Extensions to this research can take many permutations across economics. In the first 
instance, this investigation, being an experimental case study, has focused solely on publicly-
traded firms in one emerging market economy. Expanding the current analysis by including 
finer controls for corporate governance, present and past political connections at the firm-
level, and/or sectoral trends could yield a better understanding of the importance of the 
dynamics between the institutional, sector-specific, and political factors in post-transition 
economies. A more in-depth analysis of the relevance of the institutional and market forces 
effects on company accounting metrics could shed new light on issues related to divergencies 
between book and market values of firm assets and the resulting misvaluations of businesses. 
Alternately, using data from smaller, less-formal businesses could help paint a broader picture 
of the effect of informal institutions on the firms most likely to encounter informality; such a 
single-country case study approach could also be utilized in other countries around the world. 
Additionally, this analysis could be replicated in a bilateral or multi-country study, opening 
the way towards for more understanding of within-country institutional distances, the 
determinants of informal institutional change, and the effect of informal institutions on other 
metrics of firm behavior.  
 
Regardless of how these extensions play out, the theoretical framework outlined within this 
paper has shown that, in the Polish context, firm decisions, and indeed firm value, is not just 
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shaped by the institutional environment as shown in formal legislation but by a complex web 
of supporting, informal institutions.    
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Baseline results 
 variables Coefficients (standard errors) 
  1 2 3 4 
 ∆ P/E(lag) 0.453169    
(0.05858)*** 
0.453169    
(0.05858)*** 
0.453168    
(0.05858)*** 
0.453168    
(0.05858)*** 
Institutional 
Variables 
ICRG 
Contract 
viability (lag) 
    -0.0135961   
(0.001776)*** 
-0.0134348   
 (0.001754)***     
CIM (lag)    0.0460723   
(0.007337)*** 
0.0464309   
(0.007405)*** 
  
Macroeconomic 
variables 
ICRG 
Economic 
Risk Rating 
(lag) 
  0.0345438   
(0.003619)*** 
0.0345276   
(0.003618)*** 
  0.0363426   
(0.003754)*** 
0.0363147    
(0.003753)*** 
WIG quarterly 
return (lag) 
0.00981931   
(0.005103)* 
 0.0190089   
(0.005600)*** 
 
WIG quarterly 
volatility (lag) 
 0.00364010  
(0.0004906)*** 
 0.00314604  
(0.0004962)*** 
∆Total credit 
/GDP (lag) 
0.000121695   
(0.002044) 
-0.000113350   
(0.002070) 
-0.00200943   
(0.002052) 
-0.00244528    
(0.002086)   
Inflation (lag) 0.000361565  
(0.0001840)** 
0.000360735  
(0.0001839)** 
0.000502012  
(0.0001954)** 
0.000499544  
(0.0001952)** 
∆M2/GDP 
(lag) 
-0.000141898   
(0.001312) 
-0.000311969   
(0.001345) 
-0.000184385   
(0.001333) 
-0.000533704    
(0.001369) 
∆GDP  (lag) -0.00539680   
(0.001754)*** 
-0.00549022   
(0.001763)*** 
-0.00576639   
(0.001780)*** 
  -0.00594632   
(0.001792)*** 
Company-level 
variables 
Size (lag) -0.000908968   
(0.001525) 
-0.000908974   
(0.001525) 
-0.000908688   
(0.001525) 
-0.000908694   
(0.001525) 
Operating 
efficiency 
(lag) 
  0.00876149    
(0.01157) 
0.00876145    
(0.01157) 
0.00876285    
(0.01157) 
0.00876281    
(0.01157) 
D/E (lag)   0.000109693  
(0.0003355) 
0.000109693  
(0.0003355) 
0.000109681  
(0.0003355) 
0.000109681  
(0.0003355)    
Firm growth 
(lag) 
-0.00822918    
(0.01992) 
-0.00822919     
(0.01992) 
-0.00822914    
(0.01992) 
-0.00822915    
(0.01992) 
 constant 0.0815635   
(0.008974)*** 
0.0817840   
(0.009013)*** 
0.0703190   
(0.008755)   
0.0709843    
(0.008825)*** 
 Number of 
observations 
7557 7557 7557 7557 
 Wald (joint): 2048000.0 
*** 
1940000.0*** 2056000.0*** 1588000.0*** 
 Wald 
(dummy): 
9091.0 ***  9091.0 *** 9062.0 *** 9063.0 *** 
 Wald (time): 9095.0 ***  9096.0*** 9067.0 *** 9067.0 *** 
 2-step Sargan 
test: 
220.5  220.5  221.3  221.2  
 AR(1) test:  -4.240***  -4.240 ***  -4.242 *** -4.242 *** 
 AR(2) test:         1.226  1.226  1.226  1.226  
Note:  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. PcGive OxMetrics software 
does not yield Hansen statistics for SYS-GMM modelling (see Doornik and Hendry, 2013 for details). 
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Table 2 Robustness analyses using both contract intensive money and ICRG Contract 
Viability as institutional metrics 
 Variables 
   1 2 
 ∆ P/E(lag) 0.495798 
(0.07165)*** 
0.477858 
(0.07608)*** 
Institutional 
Variables 
CIM (lag) 0.021734 
(0.009483)** 
0.0268277    
(0.008199)** 
 ICRG Contract 
Viability (lag) 
-0.0179044 
(0.003510)*** 
-0.0197407    
(0.003421)*** 
Macroeconomic 
Variables 
ICRG Economic Risk 
Rating (lag) 
0.0258012 
(0.003519)*** 
0.026698 
(0.003853)*** 
WIG quarterly return 
(lag) 
0.00135140 
(0.007280) 
- 
WIG quarterly 
volatility (lag) 
- 0.0049586 
(0.0008866)*** 
∆Total credit /GDP 
(lag) 
-0.0003077 
(0.001820) 
-0.0003118 
(0.001826) 
Inflation (lag) 0.000417414 
(0.0002345)* 
0.0004839   
(0.0002064)** 
 
∆M2/GDP (lag) 0.00189761 
(0.001290) 
0.00211414   
(0.001179)* 
∆GDP (lag) 0.00268392 
(0.0006663)*** 
0.00295295   
(0.0005334)*** 
Company-level 
variables 
Size (lag) 0.0016978 
(0.002725) 
0.00012022   
(0.0007914) 
Operating efficiency 
(lag) 
-0.00230621 
(0.001576) 
-0.00227353    
(0.002115) 
D/E (lag) 0.000281513 
(0.0000498)*** 
0.000271595  
(0.000053)*** 
Firm growth (lag) -0.006448 
(0.01251) 
-0.00604682     
(0.01616) 
 constant 0.0346974 
(0.007795)*** 
0.0399467    
(0.008068)*** 
 Number of 
observations 
7557 7557 
 Wald (joint): 0.000002*** 0.000002*** 
 Wald (dummy): 0.000078*** 0.0000012*** 
 Wald (time): 6805.0 8650.*** 
 2-step Sargan test: 204.1 280.01 
 AR(1) test: -4.201*** -4.256*** 
 AR(2) test:         1.324 1.300 
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Robustness analyses using contract-intensive money as the property rights metric 
 Variables Coefficients (standard errors) 
  1 2 3 
 ∆ P/E (lag) 0.453169     
(0.05858)*** 
0.453169     
(0.05858)*** 
  0.453169     
(0.05858)*** 
Institutional 
Variables 
CIM (lag) 0.0464721    
(0.007333)*** 
0.0431027   
(0.007100)*** 
0.0430808    
(0.007110)*** 
Macroeconomic 
Variables 
ICRG Economic Risk 
Rating (lag) 
  0.0345774    
(0.003614)*** 
0.0348019   
(0.003645)*** 
0.0349087    
(0.003655)*** 
WIG quarterly return 
(lag) 
0.00990834    
(0.005098)* 
- - 
S&P500 (lag) - 0.0490868    
(0.01372)*** 
- 
Stoxx Euro 600 (lag) - - 0.0479480     
(0.01324)*** 
∆Total credit /GDP 
(lag) 
0.000107115    
(0.002047)   
0.000716422   
(0.002062) 
0.000973199    
(0.002075) 
Inflation (lag) 0.000347190   
(0.0001789)* 
0.000327121  
(0.0001831)* 
0.000293120   
(0.0001832) 
∆M2/GDP (lag) -0.000299855    
(0.001203) 
0.000593086   
(0.001276) 
0.000850249    
(0.001239) 
∆GDP (lag)   -0.00550298    
(0.001698)*** 
-0.00510431   
(0.001723)*** 
-0.00494955    
(0.001706)*** 
∆FDI/GDP (lag) -0.00879855    
(0.007310) 
- - 
Company-level 
variables 
Size (lag) -0.000908967    
(0.001525) 
-0.000908936   
(0.001525) 
-0.000908929   
 (0.001525) 
Operating efficiency 
(lag) 
  0.00876151   
(0.01157) 
0.00876168     
(0.01157)   
   0.00876173     
(0.01157) 
D/E (lag) 0.000109693   
(0.0003355)   
  0.000109691  
(0.0003355) 
  0.000109691   
(0.0003355) 
Firm growth (lag) -0.00822916     
(0.01992) 
-0.00822916     
(0.01992) 
-0.00822914     
(0.01992) 
 constant 0.0814641   
(0.008970)*** 
0.0762459   
(0.008372)*** 
0.0764180    
(0.008444)*** 
 Number of 
observations 
7557 7557 7557 
 Wald (joint): 2059000.0*** 1689000.0*** 1734000.0*** 
 Wald (dummy):   9091.0 *** 9091.0 *** 9091.0 *** 
 Wald (time): 9095.0*** 9095.0 *** 9095.0 *** 
 2-step Sargan test: 220.5  220.6  220.6  
 AR(1) test: -4.240*** -4.240 *** -4.240 *** 
 AR(2) test:         1.226  1.226  1.226  
NoteL; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 4: Robustness analyses using ICRG contract viability as the property rights metric 
 variables Coefficients (standard errors) 
  1 2 3 
 ∆ P/E(lag) 0.453168     
(0.05858)*** 
0.453168    
(0.05858)*** 
0.496686     
(0.06633)*** 
Institutional 
Variables 
ICRG Contract 
Viability (lag) 
-0.0135981 
(0.001767)*** 
-0.0127689   
(0.001720)*** 
-0.0115522    
(0.001784)*** 
Macroeconomic 
Variables 
ICRG Economic Risk 
Rating (lag) 
0.0363413 
(0.003747)*** 
0.0364567   
(0.003769)*** 
0.0325854    
(0.004386)*** 
WIG quarterly return 
(lag) 
0.0190063    
(0.005594)*** 
- - 
S&P500 (lag) - 0.0436344    
(0.01369)*** 
- 
Stoxx Euro 600 (lag) - - 0.0379376     
(0.01384)*** 
∆Total credit /GDP 
(lag) 
-0.00200907    
(0.002055) 
-0.00158484   
(0.002062) 
-0.00113356    
(0.001973) 
Inflation (lag) 0.000502499  
0.0001913*** 
0.000462555  
(0.0001944)** 
0.000366516   
(0.0001719)** 
∆M2/GDP (lag) -0.000178793    
(0.001213) 
0.000295521   
(0.001291) 
0.000405805   
 (0.001327) 
∆GDP (lag) -0.00576281   
 (0.001721)*** 
-0.00557626   
(0.001745)*** 
-0.00452019    
(0.001751)*** 
∆FDI/GDP 0.000289759 
(0.007148) 
- - 
Company-level 
Variables 
Size (lag) -0.000908685    
(0.001525) 
-0.000908677   
(0.001525) 
0.00312301    
(0.001431)** 
Operating efficiency 
(lag) 
0.00876287  
(0.01157) 
0.00876291    
(0.01157) 
  0.00511679    
(0.006716) 
D/E (lag)   0.000109681 
(0.0003355) 
0.000109680  
(0.0003355) 
0.000190472   
(0.0004878) 
Firm growth (lag) -0.00822913     
(0.01992) 
-0.00822913    
(0.01992) 
-0.00409737     
(0.02463) 
 constant 0.0703192 
(0.008756)*** 
 0.0665457   
(0.008266)*** 
0.0575649   
 (0.009002)*** 
 Number of observations 7558 7558 7558 
 Wald (joint): 2056000.0***   1524000.0*** 2.247000.0*** 
 Wald (dummy): 9062.0 *** 9063.0 *** 6579.0 *** 
 Wald (time): 9067.0*** 9067.0 *** 6588. *** 
 2-step Sargan test: 221.3  221.3 203.9  
 AR(1) test: -4.242*** -4.243 *** -0.05573  
 AR(2) test:         1.226 1.226  0.9685  
Note; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Figure 1: Informal Institutional Influence 
 
 
 
Note: Based on Peng (2006).
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Figure 2:  Property rights in Poland, 2007-2015 
 
 
Sources: ICRG; the National Bank of Poland 
 
Figure 3: International Country Risk Guide political risk rating for Poland, 2007-2015, 
and informal property rights 
 
Source:  ICRG database, author’s estimates  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1 Summary statistics 
 Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Standard 
deviation 
Institutional 
variables 
ICRG Contract Viability (ICRG 
CV) 
3.34783 3.50000 3.0000 0.23007 
Contract intensive money (CIM) 0.86969 0.87998 0.85305 0.00909 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
ICRG Economic Risk Rating 
(ICRG ERR) 
36.38571 39.50000 33.0000 1.71999 
Quarterly stock market return 
from the WIG overall index 
-0.01333 0.20258 -0.32759 0.10957 
Quarterly market volatility of the 
WIG overall index 
0.00948 
 
0.02998 
 
0.00224 
 
0.00746 
 
S&P 500 quarterly returns 0.00871 0.10515 -0.27159 0.07112 
Stoxx Euro 600 quarterly returns  0.00004 0.16380 -0.26270 0.09270 
∆Domestic credit to the private 
sector by banks  
0.00619 
 
0.05001 
 
-0.05258 
 
0.01675 
Inflation 99.50000 101.8000 99.5000 0.71711 
∆M2/GDP 0.01406 0.04952 -0.01887 0.01580 
GDP growth 0.03514 0.07447 -0.00029 0.01796 
FDI/GDP 0.00124 0.17621 -0.15124 0.09729 
Company-level 
variables 
Size 12.21308 17.64638 
 
0.0000 2.50080 
Operating efficiency 0.67945 1.37787 -72.6000 0.92489 
D/E 0.14853 6.98038 -5386.3300 62.89675 
Firm growth -0.01003 1.27429 -7.43189 0.42428 
P/E 1.48980 12.98000 0.0000 1.63510 
Note A1: Data retrieved from the sources listed in the text; transformed in order to eliminate the outlying 
observations - see Section 3 for details. Where possible, data is rounded up to the 5th decimal place 
 
Figure A1 ICRG metrics vs Poland market risk 
 
Note A2 Data retrieved from the ICRG database and A. Damodaran online repository 
(http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datacurrent.html accessed 19th May 2018) 
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Table A2 Variable description and source 
 Variable Comments Data source 
Institutional 
Variables 
ICRG Contract 
Viability (ICRG CV) 
It presents property rights and how secureable they are as a function of the coutnry’s legislation 
related to ownership of property and its danger of being expropriated by the ruling government; 
scores from 0 to 4 – where higher numbers reflect stronger property rights.  
ICRG 
Contract intensive 
money (CIM) 
Calculated as M2 less money held outside the banking sector relative to all M2.  Author’s own calculations 
based on data from the 
National Bank of Poland 
Macroeconomic 
Variables 
ICRG Economic Risk 
Rating (ICRG ERR) 
It proxies for economic risk, with lower scores translating to higher economic risk and volatility; it 
combines measures such as but not limited to Current Account as a Percentage of GDP, GDP per 
Head, and Budget Balance as a Percentage of GDP (for a full methodological disclosure International 
Country Risk Guide Methodology p. 8). 
ICRG 
Quarterly stock 
market return from 
the WIG overall 
index 
It captures quarterly return rates from the domestic market. Stooq 
Quarterly market 
volatility of the 
overall index 
Calculated as in Hartwell (2014) Stooq 
S&P 500 quarterly 
returns 
It captures quarterly return rates from the US benchmark stock market. Marketwatch and The FRED 
St Louis Fed Economic 
Database 
Stoxx Euro 600 
quarterly returns  
It captures quarterly return rates from the Pan-European benchmark stock market. Marketwatch  
∆Domestic credit to 
the private sector by 
banks  
Total bank credit to firms and households as percent of GDP, it proxies for the development of the 
banking system. 
The FRED St Louis Fed 
Economic Database 
Inflation Calculated as quarterly change in the index, set to capture the central bank’s approach to 
macroeconomic policy. 
The FRED St Louis Fed 
Economic Database 
∆M2/GDP Log change in M2 scaled by domestic GDP; set to capture the government’s approach to sound 
money and macroeconomic management 
Authors’ own calculations 
based on data from the 
National Bank of Poland 
GDP growth It captures the general dynamic of domestic growth, quarter-to-quarter. The FRED St Louis Fed 
Economic Database 
∆FDI/GDP Calculated as log change in FDI scaled by domestic GDP; proxies for the economy’s degree of 
openness to foreign capital and innovation. 
Author’s own calculations 
based on data retrieved from 
the Central Statistical Office 
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(??) 
Company-level 
variables 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets.  Authors’ own calculations 
based on data from NOTORIA 
D/E Calculated as a debt-to-equity ratio Authors’ own calculations 
based on data from NOTORIA 
Operating efficiency Calculated as an operating expenses-to-net-sales ratio; it captures the efficiency of a company’s 
management – the lower the ratio, the greater the firm’s ability to record profits if revenues from 
sales plummet.  
Authors’ own calculations 
based on data from NOTORIA 
Firm growth Calculated as % change of sales (quarter-to-quarter) Authors’ own calculations 
based on data from NOTORIA 
Firm price-to-
earnings value (P/E) 
It denotes change in relative firm market value (expressed as a log change in company price-to-
earnings ratio (P/BV) measured year-over-year. 
Authors’ own calculations 
based on data from Stooq 
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Table A3 Correlation matrix 
  
Euro 
Stoxx 
600 
S&P500 GDP growth 
ICRG 
ERR 
ICRG 
CV Inflation CIM 
Total 
credit 
∆M2/GD
P 
Market 
vol. 
WIG 
return D/E OE 
Firm 
Growth Size FDI 
EuroStoxx600 1.00 0.801 -0.107     -0.177 0.126 -0.003 0.023 -0.403 -0.139   -0.314 0.727   -0.003 -0.007 -0.011 0.047 -0.034 
S&P500 
 
1.00 -0.047 -0.092 0.118 -0.175 0.013 -0.349 -0.051 -0.259 0.617 -0.004 -0.011 -0.001 0.065 -0.010 
GDP growth 
  
1.00 -0.202 0.131 -0.133   -0.021 0.003 0.189 0.169   -0.002 -0.002 -0.0109 0.022 0.068 -0.215 
ICRG ERR 
   
1.00 -0.009 0.003 -0.057 0.171 -0.202 0.021 0.034 -0.005 0.008 -0.022 -0.006 0.288 
ICRG CV 
    
1.00 0.210 -0.124 -0.144 0.121   -0.135 0.086   -0.011 0.009 -0.001 0.010 0.049 
Inflation 
     
1.00 -0.029 0.055 0.024 0.144 -0.048 -0.002 -0.007 0.087 -0.022 -0.264 
CIM 
      
1.00 -0.121 -0.235 0.114 0.083 -0.003 0.003 -0.023 -0.014 0.174 
Total credit 
       
1.00 0.208   0.318 -0.367 0.032 0.003 0.013 -0.036 -0.010 
∆M2/GDP 
        
1.00 0.182 -0.321 0.012 -0.011   0.102 -0.024 -0.413 
Market vol. 
         
1.00 -0.268 0.001 0.004   -0.011      -0.099 0.185 
WIG return 
          
1.00 -0.001 -0.012 -0.005 -0.006 0.069 
D/E 
           
1.00 -0.001 0.004 -0.017 0.0215 
OE 
            
1.00 0.022 0.068     0.011 
Firm Growth 
             
1.00 0.020 -0.215 
Size 
              
1.00 -0.040 
FDI 
               
1.00 
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Table A4 Stationarity test results 
 variable ADF Test results 
Institutional Variables ICRG Contract 
Viability (ICRG CV) 
Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared(48) = 2785.06***  
Inverse normal test = -51.2177***  
test Logit: t(124) = -157.994*** 
Contract intensive 
money (CIM) 
Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 3589.56*** 
Inverse normal test = -58.4409*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -203.633*** 
Macroeconomic 
Variables 
ICRG Economic Risk 
Rating (ICRG ERR) 
Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 3250.27*** 
Inverse normal test = -55.1758*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -184.385*** 
Quarterly stock market 
return from the WIG 
overall index 
Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 4462.39*** 
Inverse normal test = -65.1464*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -253.147*** 
Quarterly market 
volatility of the overall 
index 
Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 3615.94*** 
Inverse normal test = -58.6853*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -205.129*** 
S&P 500 quarterly 
returns 
Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 4449.74*** 
Inverse normal test = -64.9323*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -252.43*** 
Stoxx Euro 600 
quarterly returns  
Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 4572.26*** 
Inverse normal test = -66.2013*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -259.381*** 
∆ Domestic credit to the 
private sector by banks 
Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 4669.7*** 
Inverse normal test = -66.5214*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -264.908*** 
Inflation Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 3929.000*** 
Inverse normal test = -61.1716*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -222.889*** 
∆M2/GDP Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 3947.9*** 
Inverse normal test = -60.872*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -223.961*** 
GDP growth  Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 31.9421* 
Inverse normal test = 0722463* 
test Logit: t(124) = 0.645569* 
∆FDI/GDP Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 4410.16*** 
Inverse normal test = -64.1673*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -250.185*** 
Company-level 
variables 
Size Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 972.844*** 
Inverse normal test = -28.4434*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -55.1885*** 
D/E Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 1650.01*** 
Inverse normal test = -37.7054***  
test Logit: t(124) = -93.6035*** 
Operating efficiency Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 967.554*** 
Inverse normal test = -27.7234*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -54.8884***  
Firm growth Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 2050.76 *** 
Inverse normal test = -43.2405*** 
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test Logit: t(124) = -116.338 *** 
Firm price-to-earnings 
value (P/E) 
Choi meta-tests: 
Inverse chi-squared (48) = 3034.43**** 
Inverse normal test = -53.6152*** 
test Logit: t(124) = -172.141*** 
Note A3; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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APPENDIX B – A NOTE ON TOBIN’S Q 
 
Research in the fields of corporate finance focused on firm market value and corporate and regulatory 
phenomena have been relying for decades on what is commonly as Tobin’s q as an appropriate proxy 
for firm value. Looking back at the original formulation of Tobin’s q and its intended role in mean-
reverting metric modelling macroeconomic investment policy, and the structural changes the metric 
has undergone since its beginnings, it becomes apparent that the current version of (so-called) Tobin’s 
q does not capture what law and finance researchers claim it does.  
 
Indeed, the original Tobin’s q meant to capture market valuation of equities, relative to the 
replacement cost of the physical assets they represent, as the key determinant of investment. Tobin 
himself argued that the key insight stemming from the introduction of q could be associated with 
monetary policy: the major channel of impacting the aggregate demand via monetary policy was “by 
changing the valuation of physical assets relative to their replacement costs”(Tobin, 1969:29) In this 
context, Tobin’s initial metric related to macroeconomics and remained irrelevant in terms of 
capturing the consequences of changes in policy or shocks on relative prices, instead emerging as a 
potential lever which could be applied to induce changes in the aggregate.  
 
Understood as such, the metric, when high, meant that the market value of an asset held by an entity 
was greater than its replacement cost. If this claim were accurate, and the entity in question could 
increase the scale of its operations, it should follow that the firm should invest in this particular kind of 
assets – and continue to do so, until their market value becomes equal to their replacement costs (i.e., 
q=1).  In this light it does not follow that firms with relatively high q-metrics also have high market 
value or that they would retain a high level of q. Indeed, in line with Tobin’s original line of thought, 
the q of any company should revert to unity in the future. More importantly, form the perspective of 
corporate finance, to the extent the market value of a firm’s assets dwarfs their replacement value, 
firms with high q are likely to face decreasing profit opportunities.  
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Obviously, since its launch in the 1960s and 1970s, the index has morphed as a result of conceptual 
differences in its use in macroeconomics and corporate finance. Indeed, the matters were taken much 
further down the road with scholars adopting diverging definitions of the metric. With the fault line 
between the two groups falling at the issue whether the macroeconomic approach or the finance 
approach was being examined, the former group examined the effects of q on investment behaviour 
utilising q defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm’s stock of tangible capital to the 
replacement value of the said stock, aligning with Tobin’s original approach.  On the other hand, 
corporate finance research perceived q as the ratio of the market value of the firm’s outstanding 
securities to the cost of replacing of all of the firm’s assets, not limited to its physical assets. This 
change was understandable, given the prevalent assumption that, in corporate finance, q could well 
approximate a firm’s overall performance and value.  
 
This broader interpretation of q, while intuitively appealing, diverged significantly from Tobin’s 
theory: indeed,  Brainard and Tobin (1968:9) had suggested that “[t]here are many kinds of physical 
capital and many markets where existing stocks are valued,” a statement explicitly suggesting that in 
an ideal world, each type of assets should possess a different, own, q metric. In the same vein, Hayashi 
and Inoue (1991:732) had claimed that “one has to invoke a very stringent set of assumptions 
including the Hicks aggregation condition [that all of the firm’s assets are perfect substitutes in the 
production process] to derive a one-to-one relation between the sum of investments and Q that is 
independent of the composition of investments.” In this context, the enthusiastic approach to 
measuring of the firm value by the means of aggregation of assets which could be as dissimilar as, 
e.g., capital goods, good will, or cash and equivalents, is bound to fail this condition. Put differently, 
while macroeconomic analyses based on q and focused on investment specifically were less concerned 
about lumping together different kinds of assets, the strand of research dealing with corporate finance 
adopted the q metric as a manner of analysing a company assets in the aggregate - regardless of their 
nature - becoming comfortable to group dissimilar categories of assets in one measure.   
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Thus, the metric evolved into a more simplified, if not simplistic form, turning the original into 
something close to a company market-to-book ratio with book value substituted for market value of 
preferred and debt securities: q = (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA where MVE represents a firm’s share 
price times the number of its common shares outstanding, PS is its liquidating value of any 
outstanding preferred stock, DEBT approximates the value of its short-term liabilities net of its short-
term assets augmented by the book value of long-term debt, and TA is the book value of its total 
assets. Widely cited studies (cf. Kaplan and Zinglaes 1997 or Perfect and Wiles 1994) used an even 
less complicated (calculation-wise) method, stating that Tobin’s q be equal to firm’s (𝛾𝛼 + 𝑀𝑉𝐸 − 𝐵𝑉 
– 𝐷𝛼)/𝛾𝛼 with AT equal to the book value of assets, MVE being the market value of common stock, 
BVE approximating the book value of common equity, and DT being balance sheet value of deferred 
taxes. With passing time, the q simplified even more, with Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar 
(2013:2524) defining it “as the ratio of the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, 
both computed at the end of each fiscal year.”22 This is precisely the measure we used in the paper. 
 
                                                          
22 For a further, in-depth discussion of the evolution of q and its misuses see Bartlett and Partnoy (2018). 
 
